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Guardians of the Constitution: Unconstitutional Constitutional Norms1 
The recent adoption of the UK Human Rights Bill offers the possibility for many developments 
in the UK legal system.2 At the centre of the change stand the new system for the protection of 
civil rights, and the re-drawn relations between the judiciary and the other branches of 
Government; combined these features raise the spectre of judicial activism. The Human Rights 
Act appears to resolve the division of responsibilities between the judges and the political 
branches in a manner which is deferential to the traditional notions of parliamentary sovereignty, 
following the example of New Zealand.3 However such textual confines are potentially 
treacherous if a court's conception of civil rights and constitutionalism leads it to embrace an 
activist approach. This article explores three foreign examples of judicial activism straining at the 
textual limits. 
Judicial activism in modern democracies is an important issue - as Bhagwati C.J. of India notes: 
"It can hardly be disputed that judicial activism is now a central feature of every 
political system that vests adjudicatory power in a free and independent judiciary."4 
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Judicial activism is liable to become particularly controversial and crucial where judges are given 
powers to protect civil rights in a constitutional system.5 Judicial activism in the cause of 
protecting civil rights poses  the paradox of constitutional justice. Protecting the civil rights of 
life, liberty, privacy, expression, and so on may collide with the exercise of the rights of political 
participation. The rights protected by the new Human Rights Act include both types of rights.6 
This clash between the rights of the ancients and the rights of the moderns is one of the great 
issues of modern political theory.7 
Activism can take many forms, as Bhagwati notes, and this article examines perhaps the most 
extreme form - the power claimed by some judges to review the constitutionality of purported 
amendments to constitutions. 
Given their enormous powers, it is right that the activities of judges should be open to public 
debate and scrutiny. The media, politicians, the public, are right to be worried about whether 
judges follow the law or something else, whether some judges are too soft on rapists, or too 
lenient with landlords. However public debate often fails to make some distinctions about the 
type of judgements that can be passed on judges: 
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 1. Is the judge faithful or unfaithful to law? Does the judge make a genuine effort to apply 
the law (no matter how surprising her conclusions may be)? 
 2. Is the judge traditional or progressive? Does the judge attach greater or lesser importance 
to the conventional understandings of legal method?8 
 3. Is the judge (in a political sense) conservative, liberal, centrist, eclectic? (A judge, like 
anyone, may be all of these, on different topics). 
 4. Does the judge have an activist or passivist conception of the legal role? (A judge may be 
activist in some areas, like procedure or remedies, and passive in others, such as interpreting 
the substantive law). 
 5. Which technique of interpretation does a judge use and why? (Semantic, historical, 
systematic (harmonious or coherentist), teleological (purposive), pragmatic, etc.) Again a 
judge may use a mixture in different areas. 
(A judge may have any mixture of these characteristics; that is one may be liberal, traditional, 
passive or conservative, activist, progressive.9) 
The fifth point, which technique of interpretation should be used, is the crucial one. The 
problems are particularly acute in the area of constitutional law, where problems of interpretation 
intersect with problems of political morality (this applies even in countries without a written 
constitution). These questions often arise because the constitution refers to vague moral or 
political concepts and then leaves it to judges to decide what such terms as "judicial 
independence" or "right to free expression" mean. Judges must often turn to principles of 
systematic and teleological interpretation to provide a concrete interpretation of the text.10 That is 
they must provide a reading of the text which provides a coherent interpretation of all of its 
provisions, and which promotes the central values of the constitution. Using similar phrases, 
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German and Irish judges have insisted that "An individual constitutional provision cannot be 
considered as an isolated clause and interpreted alone. A constitution has an inner unity, and the 
meaning of any one part is linked to that of other provisions."11 But courts must not simply 
harmonise those provisions, they must aim to realise their purpose, and more particularly the 
central purposes of the Constitution.12 German, Irish and Indian judges all refer constantly to 
open-ended but powerful concepts such as the central values of the “free democratic order” and 
“human dignity”,13  “dignity and freedom of the individual” a “just social order”.14 
This coherentist, value-laden approach to interpretation also seems to be mandated by the 
European Convention on Human Rights (particularly its Preamble) and presumably the 1998 
Human Rights Act. As British judges will be called upon to apply similarly open-ended terms, it 
is important to realise the extremes to which their interpretation can lead. 
In developing such interpretative theories, judges often stress the central position of fundamental 
rights. Sometimes they emphasise in different ways, that rights are in some sense prior to 
political society. In any event rights, and other principles of democratic states (separation of 
powers, elections) are identified as the ultimate point of the basic law. Using these techniques 
judges may give concrete meaning to vague concepts. Yet these interpretative principles of 
coherence and effectuation of central provisions, may catapult the judge from the role of deciding 
the constitutionality of statutes to determining the legitimacy of the basic law itself. The people's 
guardian of the Constitution against politicians, may turn into a guardian of the Constitution 
against all comers.  
This may happen if a constitutional amendment is proposed which makes no sense in any 
coherent interpretation of a Constitution which centres on certain values, such as antecedently 
existent human rights. If an amendment cannot be treated as a coherent part of a constitution 
which defends certain values, then what are judges to do? The attitude of German, Irish and 
Indian judges, speaking judicially and extra-judicially, as regards the topic of unconstitutional 
constitutional norms is the concern of this paper. 
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In approaching the topic of unconstitutional norms some factors must be considered. All three 
Constitutions authorise the judiciary to review the constitutionality of ordinary statutes, and so 
the role of the courts as watchdogs over the legislator is not in dispute. Their role as watchdogs 
over the amending power depends on a number of other factors: 
 First, what is the amending procedure provided in the Constitution?
 Second, does the constitution explicitly state that some constitutional  provisions are
entrenched and cannot be removed or altered by amendment? Or make some provisions more
difficult to amend?15
 Third, is there express provision for amendments to be subject to judicial review, to test their
procedural propriety, or their substantive consistency with the Constitution?
 Fourth, does the constitution explicitly state that some provisions are hierarchically superior
to others? Is it implicit in the constitution, as interpreted by judges? Indeed, does the
Constitution, properly interpreted recognise the possibility of rights which have a status
superior to positive law? Some Irish, Indian and German judges have suggested that
fundamental rights are only recognised by the constitution; their normative force rests on a
supra-constitutional morality.
Bound up in all of this is the central question in law: what is the role of interpretation when 
judges are faced with the open-ended and portentous language of human rights instruments? 
When discussing each country, this article offers a  few words on its constitutional structure, 
looking briefly at the procedure of adoption and amendment, and referring to those provisions on 
which the doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional norms rests. It then analyses the cases where 
the tension between judicially protected civil rights and the democratic process expresses itself in 
a consideration of the constitutionality of constitutional amendments. 
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GERMANY 
The German Constitution establishes a rationalised parliamentary system, with a bicameral 
Parliament, which designates the ceremonial President. The Prime Minister requires the 
confidence of the Lower House. The Constitution is an enforceable one, and the Federal 
Constitutional Court of Karlsruhe has often exercised its power to enforce the Constitution.16 
The 1949 German Constitution reflects the recoiling of a nation from a nightmare. Its very first 
article identifies human dignity as a fundamental principle which all state authority must respect. 
Art. 20 declares Germany to be a democratic and social federal state, founded on popular 
sovereignty, the rule of law and separation of powers. (It also protects the right of resistance.) 
The drafters of the Constitution regarded these two articles as the most basic blocks of the new 
constitutional order:  although for most purposes the Constitution can be amended by a vote of 
two-thirds majority in each house of Parliament, the article on Amendment (Art. 79) excludes the 
possibility of amending the federal nature of the State, or Art. 20 or Art. 1. 
In one of its very first cases, the Southwest State Case, the Federal Constitutional Court handed 
down important rulings on how the Constitution was to be interpreted and what it stood for. It 
emphasised that the Constitution is a coherent document, that is all its provisions must be 
interpreted as meshing together to form a unified "logical-teleological entity".17 The Constitution 
reflects an "objective order of values". The most important of these basic values are the 
principles of human dignity and democracy (others include the separation of powers, popular 
sovereignty). Art. 79.3 protects these most important basic values by making Arts. 1 and 20 
unamendable. 
There is therefore a clear textual authority for substantial limits on the constitution-amending 
power. Yet one strand of German constitutional thought goes even further. Some judges suggest 
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that there exist a range of "super positive" norms variously referred to as the "natural law" or 
"justice".18 These super positive norms bind not only the legislative and the amending power but 
also the constituent power. Some commentators seem to be of the opinion that there is a 
dangerous tension between these two conceptions of civil rights in Germany, and that even an 
application of Art. 79.3 may hide a covert appeal to "natural law" values.19 Some commentators 
feel that the positive provisions of Art. 79 resolves any possible tension between these two 
approaches.20 
On either approach, German judges accept the doctrine of "unconstitutional constitutional 
norms".21 The doctrine is controversial - is it judicial super legislation, or a conscientious 
application of Art. 79? It is noteworthy that the German Constitution does not explicitly 
authorise the judiciary to review the legality of constitutional amendments (even though that 
power is expressly conferred in relation to ordinary statutes). The Federal Constitutional Court 
claimed this power for itself as necessary for it to protect the objectove order of values on which 
the Constitution rests.  
This is not just an academic debate. Questions on the validity of constitutional amendments have 
been raised in the Constitutional Court, and in at least one case, the Federal Constitutional Court 
came to within one vote of invalidating a constitutional amendment. 
In 1970, the German Parliament amended Art. 10 of the Constitution (privacy of 
communications) to allow for interception of communications without informing the object of 
the surveillance, and without judicial supervision (though with administrative supervision). A 
number of lawyers and state officials challenged the constitutionality of the Amendment and the 
statute passed pursuant to it.22 
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The Court divided four to four on the issue of the constitutionality of the Amendment. Under 
German law, a clear majority of judges must vote against the Government for a measure to be 
invalidated and thus the amendment survived. 
The four judges upholding the law, referred to the necessity to give the Constitution an integrated 
coherent meaning. In particular, they referred to the notion of streitbare demokratie, ("militant 
democracy")23: the Constitution intends that its democratic liberal values should be adequately 
defended. The democratic state must be protected, and so the Constitution must permit its agents 
to use reasonable means for that purpose. In this case, the new rules on surveillance were 
necessary to deal with secret organisations who might plot against the State. The means chosen 
were proportionate. 
These four judges emphasise that Art. 79 only prohibits eliminating the fundamental bases of 
liberal democracy - it does not forbid altering specifics in particular cases. Provided the principle 
(basic feature) remains, Art. 79 is not violated. The section in no way infringes the dignity of 
man., as there are adequate safeguards in the measures. 
The "dissenters" disagreed. For them Arts. 1 and 20 form the "cornerstone" of the Constitution. 
In particular human dignity must be given a wide meaning. It is not merely grossly excessive 
action which violates human dignity. In combination with Art. 20, it requires that the individual 
be given adequate access to judicial protection of her rights. According to the dissenters, Art. 
79.3 prohibits any measure affecting Art. 1 and Art. 20; it does not just prohibit the abolition of 
those principles. 
The amendment clearly affects those provisions. In providing for secret surveillance, it may 
intrude on the lives not just of spies, but of ordinary persons, all without judicial authorisation. 
The substituted system of control was not adequately neutral or separate from the legislative and 
executive. In brief "it is contradictory to abandon inalienable constitutional principles in order to 
protect the Constitution".24 
These more liberal judges lost the day, and the Constitutional Court has never again come so 
close to invalidating an amendment approved by super-majorities in each chamber of the 
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legislator. Yet the power is still asserted (a power which the constitutional text does not explicitly 
sanction) and the spectre raised, sometimes in quite important areas of public policy.25  
IRELAND 
This issue first arose in Ireland under the 1922 Constitution, since superseded by that of 1937. 
Certain provisions of the 1922 document must be understood. It was enacted by a Constituent 
Assembly in a Constitution Act, which contained two appendixes (called "schedules"). The first 
was the Anglo-Irish Treaty (which brought an end to the Anglo-Irish War), the second was the 
Irish Free State Constitution.26 The Act declared that the Anglo-Irish Treaty was to take 
precedence over the Constitution. The constitution created a classic liberal state (in theory) 
complete with separation of powers, elections and guarantees of personal liberty. The 
Westminster Parliamentary model was adopted in its essentials: a Prime Minister (called the 
"President of the Executive Council") elected by the Lower House of Parliament (Dáil Éireann), 
with the power to name the Government and dissolve Parliament.  
Two amendment procedures were specified (Arts. 47, 50). The normal one involved a bill being 
passed by Parliament and then being approved by the people in a referendum to become effective 
as an amendment. However the Constituent Assembly was concerned that technical issues might 
arise during the infancy of the Constitution, which would require a less cumbersome method of 
changing the basic law. Accordingly they provided that the Parliament could adopt any 
amendment, by a simple majority, within an eight year period from the coming into force of the 
Constitution (Art. 50). 
Faced with threats to its authority during the 1920s and 30s, the Government used its 
parliamentary majority to enact three amendments in particular. Two of these dealt with the 
amendment provision: one abolished the procedure for amendment by referendum (10th Amdt.), 
another extended the 8 year period to a 16 year period (16th Amdt.). As a consequence, the 
25
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Government believed  the 1922 Constitution was not a rigid one, but could always be amended 
by a simple majority in Parliament, without reference to the people. 
With the third amendment, the Government gutted the constitutional safeguards of liberty and 
fair procedures. The 17th Amendment inserted a new article, Article 2A (Emergency Powers) 
into the Constitution, which was a "pioneer piece of constitution draftsmanship".27 It expressly 
declared that it was to be superior to every succeeding article of the Constitution. This provision 
could be activated by the Executive, whenever it believed such activation to be expedient (note 
that there was no requirement that a war, or armed rebellion exist). If activated, it conferred 
remarkable powers on the Executive.  Art. 2A (Emergency Powers) provided for internment 
without trial (detention at the whim of the executive), and the creation of a military "court" of 
extraordinary power (the "Constitution Special Powers Tribunal"). This "court" was composed of 
military officers, who need not have any legal training, appointed by and removed at the will of 
the Government. The "court" could try persons for any "offence", including for conduct which 
was not criminal at the time it was committed. The "court" could impose any sentence it choose, 
notwithstanding statutory provisions, up to and including death, if it thought the death penalty 
"expedient". It could direct the manner in which such execution should take place. No official 
inquiry would be permitted regarding such executions. No member of the "court" could be sued 
or prosecuted for something done while acting as a member of the Tribunal. Furthermore, the 
provision stated that the sworn statements of certain police officers were legally irrebuttable by 
cross examination or evidence. Needless to mention the court was not bound by the ordinary 
rules of evidence, or even the requirement of a public trial (that is, it could exclude members of 
the public from the court), nor was there a right of appeal. It was the "antithesis of the rule of 
law."28 And it was part of the Constitution.  
The amendment was attacked by the opposition of the day, led by Eamon DeValera. Specifically, 
he condemned it as an assault on true Irish nationalists. Shortly afterwards, DeValera came to 
power, to a large extent with the help of nationalist support - and promptly used the measure to 
deal with both extreme nationalist and quasi-fascist groups. 
In State (Ryan) v. Lennon, this measure came under attack during an application to vindicate the 
right to personal liberty (habeas corpus application).29 The plaintiff was in the unfortunate 
27
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position of having to argue that the article of the constitution was itself invalid. The case went 
before a three judge Supreme Court, comprising Kennedy C.J., Fitzgibbon and Murnaghan JJ. 
The majority bluntly reject the claim that Art. 2A (Emergency Powers) was unconstitutional. 
Dealing with the argument that rights were intended by the Constituent Assembly to be 
inviolable, Fitzgibbon J. considers that: 
"[The enactors of the Constitution] may have intended to "bind man down from 
mischief by the chains of the Constitution" but if they did, they defeated their object 
by handing him [Parliament] the key of the padlock....30 
The majority's argument is simple in its logic and devastating in its implications. The Constituent 
Assembly had created a Constitution, and in it had given the Parliament a power to amend it, but 
specified no explicit restrictions (with the exception that amendments which violated the Anglo-
Irish Treaty were invalid, as the Constitution Act which gave force to the Constitution so 
specified that the Treaty was superior). The amendments were formally valid and there could be 
no review of their substance.  In particular, it was not for the judges to decide that there was a 
hierarchy of constitutional principles, and it was not for them to decide which constitutional 
provisions were valid and which not. There is no "spirit embodied in our original constitution 
which is so sacrosanct and immutable" that contrary amendments are invalid.31 
However there was one dissenting opinion, that of the Chief Justice, Hugh Kennedy. Kennedy 
was a nationalist lawyer (one of the drafters of the Constitution) who believed that the moth 
ridden straitjacket of the British positivist formalist tradition, a straitjacket in which his 
colleagues were enmeshed, ought to be decisively rejected. Kennedy C.J. notes that the 17th 
Amendment is "no mere amendment ... but effects a radical alteration of the basic scheme and 
principles of the Constitution ...."32 Kennedy C.J. argues that any amendment of the Constitution 
had to be judged by several substantive standards. 
The first was the Treaty which is declared to prevail in case of inconsistency, in the Constitution 
Act. All three judges agreed on this point, which proved an embarrassment for the Government 
which was amending the Anglo-Irish Treaty out of constitutional existence. However nothing in 
the Treaty affected the three amendments involved in this case. 
30
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Second, the Constituent Assembly specified that some provisions were of special value: 
separation of powers in Art. 2, the inviolability of liberty in Art. 6, the inviolability of one's 
residence in Art. 7, free conscience, expression and worship in Arts. 8 and 9 (note that these last 
two articles do not refer to inviolability). The Constituent Assembly cannot, according to the 
Chief Justice,33 be thought to have declared these principles to be inviolable and yet authorised 
their amendment, so Art. 50 (Parliamentary Amendment) must be subject to an implicit 
restriction as regards these: 
"... the Constituent Assembly cannot be supposed to have in the same breadth 
declared certain principles to be fundamental and immutable, or conveyed that sense 
in some other words, as by a declaration of inviolability, and at the same time to have 
conferred upon the Oireachtas [Parliament] power to violate them or to alter them."34 
However this does not explain why the Constituent Assembly did not simply say that the 
Amending power did not extend to those provisions. 
A third argument centres on the nature of the amending power. According to the Chief Justice, 
the amending power is something outside of the Constitution itself, that is the Constituent 
Assembly could have declined to create an amending power, or could have bestowed the 
amending power on some other body.35 Further, the Constituent Assembly may grant only a 
limited power of amendment, if it chooses. Did the amendment power include a completely 
unfettered power extending even to the amending of the amending power itself? This seems 
unlikely, because the amending power is itself curtailed (requirement of referendum, procedure 
of enactment). There is no sense in conferring a limited power of amendment which include the 
power to remove the limits so carefully put. In this case, if the amending power included the 
possibility of amending the power itself, this would be so unusual that one would expect to find 
this explicitly stated.36 (The majority agreed that such was unusual but that it was not legally 
impossible.) 
The fourth ground specified by Kennedy C.J. is the most interesting. It is a "spectacular assertion 
of natural law values."37 The Constitution Act (that is, the act passed by the Constituent 
33
 See Golak Nath, [1967] A.I.R.  2 S.C. 762, 787. 
34
p. 209.
35
p. 218.
36
p. 218 - 9.
37
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Assembly which created the Constitution) referred to God as the source of all authority and 
Parliament had no power to alter the Constitution Act, as distinct from the Constitution. That is, 
the Constituent Assembly, exercising its unfettered sovereign power declared that all authority, 
under the Constitution derives from God. The reference to God was an implicit reference to 
God's authority, and to the Natural Law, discoverable by reason. This meant that any positive law 
which violated Natural Law was invalid (or in Kennedy's phrase, unconstitutional, invalid, 
absolutely null and void and inoperative38). The vesting of such arbitrary power to kill in the 
hands of servants of the executive constituted such a violation and the article was null and void.39 
In particular the provision violated the law of God, as it was an outrageous attempt to deprive 
judges of the power vested in them by Natural Law to do justice in dealings between citizen and 
state. 
However the Chief Justice's defence of fundamental rights and the rule of law was only a 
dissenting opinion. Kennedy's was a lone voice crying in a positivistic wilderness, but it was not 
a cry which went unheeded forever. 
In 1937 a new Constitution was adopted, by a popular referendum (thus founding it on a new 
Grundnorm - basic norm - and supplanting the old one). The Constitution is an unusual mixture 
of different philosophies. Thus for instance, the Preamble refers to the Holy Trinity, the common 
good, and the duty to assure the dignity and freedom of the individual. Art.44, as originally 
formulated, referred first to the duty to hold the name of God in reverence, and to the "special 
position" of the Roman Catholic church,40 and then proceeds to guarantee freedom of religion, to 
prohibit religious discrimination, and to prohibit endowments of religion.  
The Constitution can only be amended by a bill which is approved by Parliament and then by the 
people in a referendum (Art. 49). According to the text, the Constitution can be amended whether 
by way of variation, repeal or addition. In brief, in any way possible. 
Under the Constitution judges of the High Court and Supreme Court are authorised to declare 
invalid any unconstitutional statute. The Constitution also includes several articles on 
fundamental rights (Arts. 40 - 44), although the Prime Minister in 1937 was of the opinion that 
these were no more than guidelines for the legislature, and were not legally enforceable. 
38
p. 205.
39
p. 204.
40
 The special position and the recognition of the Jewish Congregation and various Christian churches was 
removed in 1972. 
14 
Until the 1960s, a formalist positivist tradition dominated Irish law. However, three decades after 
the Ryan case, a new breed of judges, who looked for inspiration across the Atlantic to the US 
Warren court, began to make their mark on Irish public life.41 The “constitutional revolution” had 
several basic planks. The judiciary reaffirmed that the Constitution is supreme over all 
institutions and bodies. It is for the Supreme Court to interpret the Constitution. Judges must 
interpret the Constitution in the present tense, that is, in the light of today's understanding of 
justice, and not that of 1937. When interpreting the Constitution, judges must give it a coherent, 
harmonious interpretation. Further, judges must protect the fundamental rights which the 
Constitution recognises - but note that the Constitution does not create them. The normative 
force of fundamental rights derives from their belonging to notions of justice, popularly called 
natural law, superior to the Constitution itself. The judiciary adopted a dynamic method of 
interpretation which required that the text be read as a coherent whole in the light of today's 
values, and that it be so interpreted as to protect personal rights. 
Only two examples of their work will be given. In Ryan v. Attorney General, the courts held that 
the provision Art. 40.3.142 protected all fundamental rights and not just those enumerated in the 
text of the constitution itself.43 Judges would decide what rights merited constitutional status as 
unenumerated rights. This approach was expressly based on the idea that the normative basis for 
rights lies outside the constitution, and that judges must refer to this basis both in interpreting 
explicit rights and in determining what rights were implicitly protected, or protected as 
unenumerated rights.  
A dramatic example of this was M'Gee v. Ireland.44 Here the Supreme Court held that it was 
unconstitutional to prevent a married woman from obtaining contraceptives - it violated her 
hitherto unknown right to marital privacy. Mr. Justice Brian Walsh issued a resounding statement 
of the philosophy of the Constitution, endorsing Kennedy's natural law approach: 
"[The fundamental rights provisions] emphatically reject the theory that there are no 
rights without laws, no rights contrary to the law and no rights anterior to the law. 
They indicate that justice is placed above the law and acknowledge that natural 
41
 Kelly says they led "nothing less than a revolution in constitutional jurisprudence" in "Fundamental Rights and 
the Constitution"  in Farrell ed., DeValera's Constitution and Ours, (Dublin, Gill and MacMillan, 1987) p. 167. 
42
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rights, or human rights, are not created by law but that the Constitution confirms their 
existence and gives them protection."45 
During the seventies judges stressed the potential of this approach. In particular Walsh J. 
emphasised that, given this interpretation, the State could not necessarily rely on its emergency 
powers to violate fundamental rights, even though the text of the Constitution apparently 
permitted it to do so.46 Furthermore, presumably fundamental rights also override the provisions 
of the EC treaties, whose constitutionality is protected by Art. 29. If taken to its ultimate 
conclusion this doctrine means that all aliens are entitled to exercise all fundamental rights, 
something not made clear in the Constitution.47 However the most dramatic and controversial 
assertion of natural law values in recent times only took place in 1993. 
In 1992 the Supreme Court upheld a limited right to abortion, in the circumstance where there 
was a serious threat to the life of the pregnant woman.48 Also in 1992 the people approved two 
amendments concerning abortion; one guaranteed the right to travel to receive services lawfully 
available abroad, the other guaranteed the right to receive information about such services.  
In 1993, a Mr. Roderick O'Hanlon published an article "Natural Rights and the Constitution" 
where he made the following argument.49 The Constitution is premised on natural law values 
which are superior to any positive law. Furthermore this natural law is a religious and not a 
secular concept. This is clear (according to O'Hanlon) from the myriad references to God and 
religion, from the opening words of the Preamble (the "Holy Trinity") to the final words of the 
text ("For the Glory of God"). The Natural Law must be interpreted as protecting fundamental 
rights, and chief amongst these is the right to life, including the right to life of the unborn. The 
constitutional amendments infringed this right, and in the light of the now redeemed opinion of 
45
 P. 310. 
46
 Art. 28.3.3. says that, in times of emergency, no statute which is expressed to be for the purpose of resolving 
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Kennedy C.J., they might be considered to be invalid amendments. Incidentally Mr. O'Hanlon is 
no academic idler - until recently he was a judge of the High Court. O'Hanlon J.'s thesis  
provoked substantial (unfavourable) academic comment,50 and was eventually rejected by the 
Supreme Court in the important Abortion Information case. 
The case arose from the reaction to the X decision. Following that decision the people approved 
the Fourteenth Amendment in a referendum, allowing for freedom to receive and impart 
information relating to services lawfully available outside the State (i.e. abortions in Britain). 
Parliament passed the Regulation of Information (Services outside the State for Termination of 
Pregnancies) Bill to implement the Fourteenth Amendment.51  
When the Bill was passed, President Robinson, after consulting with senior constitutional 
officers, decided to refer the Bill to the Supreme Court under Art. 26 of the Constitution for a 
determination of its validity. The Court appointed two sets of lawyers to argue against the Bill, 
one set invoking the right to life of the pregnant woman, one set invoking the right to life of the 
foetus. The Court handed down a single opinion (as required by Art. 26), read by Hamilton C.J. 
confirming the Bill's validity, and so precluding it from ever being challenged again in a court 
action.52  One important element of this decision is the treatment of “natural law”; another 
important element is the role of constitutional interpretation. 
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Counsel arguing the position of the foetus tried to argue that the Fourteenth Amendment on 
which the bill was based was itself unconstitutional. The argument ran as follows: the 
Constitution is founded on the natural law; anything which assists in an abortion violates the 
natural law; the provision of abortion information is such a violation and so cannot be rendered 
constitutional by a referendum. In making this argument the lawyers were relying on some of the 
more extreme statements made by Irish lawyers about the natural law underpinnings of the 
Constitution.53  
The Supreme Court dismisses this claim: "The court does not accept this argument" (p. 102). 
This argument assumes, wrongly, that the natural law is the foundational law of the State. Art. 5 
of the Constitution identifies Ireland as a "sovereign, independent democratic state". Art. 6 of the 
Constitution says that all powers of government derives "under God, from the people, whose 
right it is ... to decide all questions of national policy ....". The people are the supreme authority 
and the Constitution is their creature.54 Those powers of government may only be exercised in the 
manner proscribed by the Constitution which creates those powers, and "limits, confines and 
restricts" them (p. 103). The Constitution is supreme, and any measure which violates it is 
invalid and unlawful (p. 104). Each organ of government is required to act "subject to the 
provisions of this Constitution", and, in addition, judges swear an oath to uphold the 
Constitution. There is no power to review the substance of a constitutional amendment, provided 
it is carried out in a procedurally correct manner.55 
Counsel's argument is based on what the Court identifies as a misreading of several cases. The 
cases which refer to unenumerated personal rights and extra-textual values do not recognise the 
natural law as superior to the Constitution (p. 105 -107).56 In particular, the Court reiterates what 
Walsh J. said in M'Gee, that in a "pluralist society", courts cannot choose between the 
philosophies of different theologians and different denominations (p. 107). What counsel sees as 
reference to the superiority of natural law is actually the interpretation of the Constitution which 
involves reference to extra-textual values. In particular the unenumerated personal rights cases do 
not establish the superiority of natural law. Rather in each case the court had: 
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" ... satisfied itself that such personal right was one which could be reasonably 
implied from and was guaranteed by the provisions of the Constitution, interpreted in 
accordance with its ideas of prudence, justice and charity." (p. 107, italics added) 
The Fourteenth Amendment is valid, and must be interpreted in accord with the Court's ideas of 
prudence, justice and charity. 
These comments on interpretation and the natural law are of the greatest importance. First, they 
emphasise that it is legitimate for courts to refer to extra-textual values to interpret the 
Constitution. The courts must pursue a synthesis between the constitutional text and fundamental 
values (p. 107). Second, these fundamental values do not override the Constitution. That would 
fail to do justice to the sovereignty of the people, who are the supreme authority. To put it in 
more theoretical terms, the natural law argument sought to vindicate natural rights, such as the 
right to life of the unborn, and put them on a higher plane than procedural rights, expressed 
through political participation. The Supreme Court rejects this position, and rather tries to find a 
synthesis which does justice both to popular sovereignty and fundamental rights.57  
The Irish courts - unlike the German Constitutional Court - rejected the power to review the 
constitutionality of procedurally correct amendments. Yet it still endorses the interpretative 
technique which makes the assertion of that power quite plausible - that the open-ended 
guarantees of rights must be interpreted according to the (judicially announced) evolving 
standards of justice. 
 
INDIA 
"Judicial restraint" and "deference" are not terms that one can easily use when discussing the 
Indian case law on this topic.  The Indian example is even more interesting than the German and 
Irish ones, primarily because Indian judges, rightly regarded as the most activist in the world, 
have  struck down several constitutional amendments. 
The 1950 Indian Constitution creates a federal structure, guarantees rights to equality and 
freedom, establishes judicial review of legislation, and sets up a national Parliament which elects 
the Prime Minister. Again, this a is a modified Westminster model, with a President exercising 
the roles of the monarch in the UK system. 
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Three amendment procedures exist in the Constitution. Certain articles foresee amendment by a 
simple legislative act. These relate to social problems where a flexible approach was thought 
necessary. Second, amendments affecting the federal structure require that a bill be approved by 
the national parliament by a vote which represents both an absolute majority of members and a 
two-thirds majority of those present and voting, plus ratification by no less than one half of the 
state legislatures. For all other provisions the procedure required is the same as the one just 
mentioned save that there is no need for ratification by any state legislature (Art. 368 
(Amendment)). 
Constitutional politics in India has been marked by clashes between the Supreme Court and the 
political organs. The Court early established that its fundamental task was to "safeguard the 
fundamental rights and liberties of the people" and this it has, at times aggressively, done.58 Thus, 
for instance, the Supreme Court has held that a constitutional amendment saying that Parliament 
shall determine the level of compensation in cases of confiscation of property, did not mean that 
Parliament had carte blanche: "compensation" has the inherent meaning of just payment. 
Indeed, many of the most bitter disputes in India centre on social and economic reform, and 
especially, the ownership of property. In 1951, 1954, 1964, and 1971 Parliament passed 
amendments which reversed court decisions relating to the regulation and confiscation of land. 
The 17th Amendment (1964), extended the power of Parliament to abolish property rights. It also 
inserted certain land reform measures into an appendix to the Constitution, the Ninth Schedule, 
to guarantee their constitutionality. 
In Golak Nath's case this constitutional amendment was challenged.59 Five judges ruled that they 
could not decide on the constitutionality of constitutional amendments. However eleven judges 
were sitting on the court and six of them ruled that Art. 368 (Amendment) did not permit the 
abridgement of rights, even by an amendment.60 The majority relied on two main reasons for 
saying that Art. 368 (Amendment), which does not refer to any exceptions to the amending 
power, did in fact have this exception. First, the rights and freedoms are given an especially 
prominent place, reflecting the fact that the people have reserved these rights to themselves: Art. 
13 (Protection of rights) expressly declares invalid any law which violates them. The priority of 
these rights is something that the Constitution recognises; it does not grant the rights. It is for this 
reason that no law can abridge fundamental rights, even if every one in the Parliament supports 
58
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it. Second, Art. 368 (Amendment) does not create any new power for the Parliament: it simply 
recognises a procedure whereby an ordinary law (albeit one passed with specified majorities) 
may amend the Constitution. The power so regulated is the legislative power, and, as just 
mentioned, Art. 13 (Protection of rights) prohibits the enactment of laws which violate rights. 
Accordingly, a law passed according to the amendment procedure is still a law and subject to Art. 
13. According to the Supreme Court, only a new Constituent Assembly can abridge fundamental 
rights. (The requirement of a new Constituent Assembly is without any foundation in the text of 
the Constitution, and it is difficult to see how it can constitutionally be done.) 
The majority declared that their decision was to have prospective effect only, and so the 
amendments in this case were accepted as enforceable. (This was the first Indian case to accept 
the US notion of prospective overruling). 
The minority condemned as fictitious the notion that Art. 368 merely recognised a special 
legislative procedure, but created no power to amend the Constitution. Rather Art. 368 
(Amendment) created a constitution amending power, a power to create constitutional, not 
merely statutory norms. 
In 1971 Indira Gandhi, seeking a mandate for reform, won a general election and her Congress (I) 
party received two-thirds of the seats of Parliament, enough to enact amendments to the 
Constitution. Parliament enacted the 24th, 25th, 26th, and 29th Amendments, to put an end to 
meddlesome judges and awkward property owners. The 24th made the following changes: it 
introduced Art. 13 clause 4, which stated that nothing in Art. 13 (Protection of Rights) applied to 
the amending power under Art. 368 (Amendment); further Art. 368 (Amendment) (3) was 
changed so as to render Art. 13 (Protection of rights) inapplicable to Art. 368; third, the 
amendment provided that Parliament may exercise the constituent power and could now amend 
the any part of the Constitution, whether by way of "addition, variation or repeal". The 25th made 
more changes to the property provisions; it provided that statute should determine the principles 
governing the amounts (not "compensation") payable upon confiscation, and that no law should 
be challenged on the grounds that the amount was inadequate. Laws giving effect to Art. 39 (b) 
or (c) (Directive Principles) were deemed to be constitutional even if they transgressed Art. 14 
(equality), Art. 19 (freedoms), or Art. 31 (property). It further declared that no law, which 
declares itself to be implementing the directive principles of social policy in Art. 39 (b) or (c) 
could have its constitutionality questioned on the grounds that it did not promote those policies.61 
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The constitutionality of these provisions was challenged in the case of Kesavananda v. State of 
Kerala.62 The first issue was whether Parliament could amend the fundamental rights provisions. 
The 13 judges held that Golak Nath was wrongly decided: Art. 368 (Amendment) permitted the 
amendment of any part of the Constitution. Accordingly the 24th Amendment was valid. 
However this was a case of one step back, and two steps forward. 
Seven of the judges (a bare majority) held that Art. 368 (Amendment) did include an implied 
limitation on the Amendment power: Parliament could only amend the Constitution, it could not 
abolish its essential features. The majority judges relied on several arguments.63 First, "amend" 
does not mean to destroy, but merely to alter non-essential elements. Second some argued that 
the Preamble and other provisions indicated that certain principles were especially important: 
constitutional supremacy, democratic republican government, secularism, separation of powers, 
federalism, welfare state, national unity, individual freedom were the values so identified, though 
the judges did not agree on the exact list. Sikri C.J. emphasised that these principles were 
founded on the dignity and freedom of the individual. These principles are immutable: the 
sovereign people would not permit them to be altered, and if they did, then they would have 
expressly said so.64 
Six judges dissented. They argued that all parts of the Constitution were of the same status, and 
none could be given such a priority over any other. The amending power clearly encompassed the 
repeal of any provision, even a basic one. One judge observed that Parliament, exercising its 
constituent power was the appropriate protector of fundamental rights.65 
One member of the seven judge majority, Khanna J., held that the right to property was not part 
of the basic structure and therefore the amendments restricting property rights were valid. 
However he agreed that the provision of the 25th Amendment purporting to oust review by the 
court over whether a law, expressed to be for the purpose of effectuating the directive policies 
(Art. 31 (b), (c)), was in fact for those purposes, was objectionable. According to the seven 
judges this would allow Parliament to do anything, simply by invoking those purposes, and that 
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would abolish judicial review and the protection of basic rights. That section was accordingly 
unconstitutional. 
Mrs. Gandhi expressed her annoyance at this, by refusing to appoint the most senior judge as the 
Chief Justice, upon the Chief Justice's retirement. Rather, she ignored this constitutional custom 
and appointed the most senior member of the six judges who opposed the essential features 
doctrine.66 However, more was to come. 
In June 1975, a High Court declared that Mrs. Gandhi's election in 1971 had been invalid 
(because she had engaged in corrupt practices) and that she was barred from election for six 
years. Gandhi's reaction was prompt and remarkable: the Prime Minister of India staged a coup 
d'état. 
She advised the President to issue a Proclamation of Emergency arising from internal 
disturbances (there had been some violence in certain areas). The rights to life, liberty and 
expression were suspended. Tens of thousands were interned without trial, including members of 
Parliament. The tamed Parliament then enacted two rather extraordinary amendments. The 38th 
provided that the decision of the President to issue a Proclamation of Emergency was 
unreviewable by any court. The 39th Amendment retrospectively altered the laws under which 
Gandhi had been convicted of election offences; and it also prohibited any court from 
adjudicating any issue on the elections of the President, Vice-President, Speaker of the House 
and the Prime Minister, even if such a matter was already pending before the court at the time of 
the amendment. One must appreciate the tact of Mrs. Gandhi in not limiting the exception just to 
the office of Prime Minister! 
At this stage Mrs. Gandhi's appeal went before the Supreme Court. The court was composed of 
five judges. Four of these, including the Chief Justice had voted against the essential features 
doctrine, and the fifth was Khanna J.67 The Chief Justice had been appointed as a "committed" 
judge, i.e. one who would promote national policies. Given the opinions expressed by the judges 
in the earlier case, Mrs. Gandhi must have felt confident. 
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The judges upheld the retrospective alteration of the election laws - Mrs. Gandhi had been validly 
elected, in law. However, the Court declared that the 39th amendment, in trying to preclude 
judicial review, violated three essential features of the constitutional system. Without judicial 
review of the fairness and legality of elections, fair democratic elections would be a myth. 
Further, equality was violated by setting a special status for four specified constitutional officers. 
Third, the invasion of the judicial power, particularly in a case already pending before the courts, 
violated the separation of powers. Therefore that section was invalid.  
This was the most significant defiant act of the judiciary during the Emergency, which lasted 
until 1977. For a time Gandhi considered implementing what would have been a new 
constitution with a French style "elected monarch", but did not. Rather, she retaliated with the 
42nd Amendment which, indeed, may be described as the constitutional amendment to end all 
constitutions. As well as extending the power of the Executive, the Amendment's 59 sections 
launched a campaign of war against the judiciary. In particular it declared Parliament's 
constituent power to be absolute, declared that legislation implementing directive policies were 
superior to fundamental rights, and restricted the courts' range of remedies and actions. The 
Amendment also required that statutes could only be invalidated if five out of seven Supreme 
Court judges voted to do so.68 The Emergency Parliament inserted 101 statutes into the 9th 
Schedule to the Constitution, thus protecting their constitutionality (The 9th Schedule now 
includes about 200 statutes). Also Parliament extended its term by a year.69 
As surely as Gandhi retaliated against the courts, retaliation was visited upon her. The electorate 
terminated its mandate for the Congress (I) party in the 1977 elections. The Janata Party 
succeeded Congress (I) after its humiliating defeat at the hands of the electorate. The JP 
proceeded to restore India to normalcy, with the 43rd and 44th Amendments. In particular, it 
greatly reduced the powers available to the Government during an Emergency. However it was 
only partially able to reverse the 42nd Amendment, because the Upper House of Parliament, one-
third of whose members are elected every two years, contained enough Gandhi supporters to 
block some of the reforms. In particular the primacy of the Directive Principles, and the absolute 
nature of the constituent power remained untouched by the reformers. Then in late 1979 Mrs. 
Gandhi returned to power. 
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Four months later, the Supreme Court reasserted itself. In Minevra Mills, the Supreme Court 
declared invalid the two offensive provisions of the forty-second amendment. Specifically, it held 
that constitutional amendments could be reviewed and that the courts could examine legislation 
to determine whether they furthered the Directive Principles.70  
"Since the Constitution had conferred a limited amending power on Parliament, the 
Parliament cannot under the exercise of that limited power enlarge that very power 
into an absolute power. Indeed a limited amending power is one of the basic features 
of our Constitution and therefore, the limitations on that power cannot be destroyed." 
(p. 1798) 
This is the most interesting of the cases, for the JP government had lacked the formal possibility 
to change this amendment, and Gandhi had no wish to change it. However the Supreme Court 
appreciated that it had both the formal doctrine and the effective legitimacy to, return (most of) 
the Indian constitution to the Indian people. 
There are two consequences of this saga. It is clear that the Indian judiciary, because of the 
sustained attacks on it, was unduly politicised in a party political sense during the late seventies, 
and this has had a detrimental effect on the judiciary.71 Second, the Supreme Court, sensing the 
popular approval of its 1980 decision, has felt encouraged in its search to reassert its role in 
Indian political life, and to redeem its record.72 Irrespective of the essential features doctrine, this 
sense of legitimacy has led the court into some quite remarkable forays of activity, under the 
guise of Public Interest Litigation.73 
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COMMENT 
What lessons can be drawn from these three examples?74 First, the mere absence of a grant of 
power does not preclude a court deciding that it has that power. Neither the German nor the 
Indian Constitution authorises explicitly the courts to control the constitution amending power's 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
commissions, for instance, Mukti Mocha v. India, [1984] A.I.R. 802 S.C. Fourth the Court has developed new 
remedies to solve these problems. In Mukti Mocha, the Court issued orders ending the debt bondage system ( def 
facto slavery) and rehabilitating persons whose lives had been blighted by it. In Hussainara Khatoon v. Bihar, the 
court reformed Bihar's pre-trial detention system, [1979] A.I.R. 1360 S.C. In Khatri v. Bihar, the court ordered that 
the state provide training for persons who had been blinded, [1981] A.I.R. 928 S.C. The Court reformed the system 
for detaining women in Sheela Barse v. Maharashtra, [1983] A.I.R. 378 S.C. 
 See also  Francis Mullin v. Administrator, Delhi, (1981) 2 S.C.R. 516, A.I.R. [1981] S.C. 746. On the right to a 
livelihood see Tellis v. Bombay Corpn. A.I.R. [1986] S.C. 180. On the right against pollution see Rural Litigation 
and Entitlement v. Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. [1985] S.C. 652. On the right against industrial hazards and pollution, see 
M.C. Mehta v. India, [1987] A.I.R. 965. 
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26 
exercise. Yet judges have - by their interpretation of the Constitution - claimed that power for 
themselves. Indeed the "logic" of basic rights seems to demand no less,75 even though this then 
conflicts with the equally basic rights of political participation rights.76 The message for British 
lawyers is clear: the extent to which the Human Rights Act controls the power of the judiciary 
will depend not just on its text, but also the interpretation given to it by the judges. 
Second, one should note that a traditional - apparently modest - method of interpretation  does 
not necessarily lead to modest results.  The Golak Nath majority relied on a semantic argument 
that Art. 368 did not create an amendment power. This was reasoning in the classic semantic 
formalist sense. The Kesavananda judges, German judges and Kennedy C.J. used the notion of a 
coherent interpretation, and more strongly emphasised the normative (i.e. moral) nature of their 
interpretation. Whether one agrees or disagrees with the results reached, one must acknowledge 
that a traditional method of interpretation did not act as a bar on judicial activism. 
In any event, the language of basic rights is such that traditional "deferential" modes of 
interpretation rapidly become unfashionable, and are replaced by methods oriented to coherence 
and values, thrusting judges into the arena of policy. British judges are of course not unaware of 
this; indeed some seem to positively welcome it.77 
The question which British lawyers must attempt to answer, as civil liberties become expressly 
acknowledged within Britain's internal legal order, is to what extent is this a new constitutional 
dispensation, and what to make of the binds that it places on judicial power to protect civil 
rights? Are those binds consonant with the expressions of human rights and dignity found in the 
same document? A judicial decision saying 'no' might seem shocking, but it would not be as 
startling  as some of the assertions of judicial power described in this article, now would it be 
without precedent.78 
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The outlines of such a judicial departure have indeed already been powerfully articulated: Sir John Laws, “Law 
and Democracy” (1995) Public Law 72. A more modest hint is found in Lord Woolf of Barnes “Droit Public - 
English Style” (1995) Public Law 57, 69.  
See K. Ewing, “The Human Rights Act and Parliamentary Democracy” (1999) 62 MLR 79 for the most recent 
discussion of the Human Rights Act. 
